Facts:
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime. Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request. Private respondent denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:1. it is premature to furnish the copies of the extradition request and supporting documents from the United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 106. Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents.2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United States District Courts.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
On August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order disposing that the respondents to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States.
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the temporary restraining order.
Issue:
1. Whether or not public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amou nting yo lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the temporary restraining order?
Ruling:
The Extradition Law provides Rules of Court shall apply, thus extradite has the basic right of notice and hearing. The RP-US Extradition Treaty under the Incorporation Clause in case of conflict is not superior over a national law. International law is given equal standing but not superior to national legislative enactment. The principle lex posterior degorat oriori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In States where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.Thus, petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him (Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment and supporting evidence.
Sunday, June 29, 2008
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA vs. EDGARDO ANGARA
Facts:
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).By signing the Final Act, 2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; andto adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions. On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents' comment and petitioners' reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper," 9 for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
Issues:
1. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.
2. Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Rulings:
1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." 12 Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." 13
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters 14 raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, 15 as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
2. In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the “concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.Petitions is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).By signing the Final Act, 2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; andto adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions. On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents' comment and petitioners' reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper," 9 for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
Issues:
1. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.
2. Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Rulings:
1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." 12 Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." 13
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters 14 raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, 15 as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
2. In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the “concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.Petitions is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
Facts:
Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a period covering 1943 and 1944, who is now charged before a Military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with having unlawfully disregarded and failed “to discharge his duties as such commander to control the operations of members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war”-comes before this court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines; to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, American attorneys from participating in the prosecution of petitioner’s case before the Military Commission; and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioner.
Issues:
1. Does Executive Order No. 68 illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of our constitutional but also our local laws, to say nothing of the fact the on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and, therefore, petitioner is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international?
2. Whether or not the two American Attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines and the appointment of the two attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty?
3. Whether or not the respondent Military Commission has jurisdiction over the petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hugue Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947?
Rulings:
1. Executive Order No. 68 which was issued by the President of the Philippines is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provided in its section 3 that “ The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the la of the nation.
2. Respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by special law and not by the Rules of Court which govern ordinary civil courts. It has already been shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such Military Commission is a valid and a constitutional law. There’s nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact, it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training. Secondly, the appointment of the two attorneys are not violative of our national sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that the United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes.
3. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these riles and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who are signatories to the two conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines were not signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a period covering 1943 and 1944, who is now charged before a Military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with having unlawfully disregarded and failed “to discharge his duties as such commander to control the operations of members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war”-comes before this court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines; to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, American attorneys from participating in the prosecution of petitioner’s case before the Military Commission; and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioner.
Issues:
1. Does Executive Order No. 68 illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of our constitutional but also our local laws, to say nothing of the fact the on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and, therefore, petitioner is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international?
2. Whether or not the two American Attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines and the appointment of the two attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty?
3. Whether or not the respondent Military Commission has jurisdiction over the petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hugue Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947?
Rulings:
1. Executive Order No. 68 which was issued by the President of the Philippines is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provided in its section 3 that “ The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the la of the nation.
2. Respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by special law and not by the Rules of Court which govern ordinary civil courts. It has already been shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such Military Commission is a valid and a constitutional law. There’s nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact, it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training. Secondly, the appointment of the two attorneys are not violative of our national sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that the United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes.
3. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these riles and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who are signatories to the two conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines were not signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Boris Mejoff vs. The Director of Prisons
Facts:
This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having denied in a decision of this court of July 30, 1949. The history of the petitioner’s detention was: Boris Mejoff is a descent who was brought to the Philippines from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latters regime in this Islands. He was arrested as a Japanese spy by US Army Counter Intelligence Corps and handed to the Commonwealth Government for the disposition. Thereafter the People’s Court ordered his release. But it was found our by the Deportation Board that he has no travel documents and was illegally entered in this country. With this, it was ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. On the contrary there’s no vessel available to take him back to ship the deportee abroad.
The court held the petitioner’s detention temporary and said that “temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements for his deportation, the Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a reasonable length of time. Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Feustice Perfecto and the writer of this decision dissented. Stice Feria and Mr. Justice Perfecto voted for the outright discharge of the prisoner from custody. Mr. Justice Paras qualified his dissent by stating he might agree “to a further detention of the herein petitioner, provided that he be released if after six months, the government is still unable to deport him. Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the government has not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight, although, it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner. The petitioner claims that he is stateless and therefore have right to asylum.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
Ruling:
1. The petition is granted. A foreign national, not enemy, against whom no criminal detention. He also has the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to human beings, as proclaimed in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, of which the Philippine is a member. The theory on which the court is given power to act is that the warrant for his without any of law. The possibility that he might join or aid disloyal elements if turned out at large does not justify prolonged detention, the remedy in that case being to impose conditions in the order of release and exact bail in a reasonable amount sufficient sureties.
This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having denied in a decision of this court of July 30, 1949. The history of the petitioner’s detention was: Boris Mejoff is a descent who was brought to the Philippines from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latters regime in this Islands. He was arrested as a Japanese spy by US Army Counter Intelligence Corps and handed to the Commonwealth Government for the disposition. Thereafter the People’s Court ordered his release. But it was found our by the Deportation Board that he has no travel documents and was illegally entered in this country. With this, it was ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. On the contrary there’s no vessel available to take him back to ship the deportee abroad.
The court held the petitioner’s detention temporary and said that “temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements for his deportation, the Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a reasonable length of time. Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Feustice Perfecto and the writer of this decision dissented. Stice Feria and Mr. Justice Perfecto voted for the outright discharge of the prisoner from custody. Mr. Justice Paras qualified his dissent by stating he might agree “to a further detention of the herein petitioner, provided that he be released if after six months, the government is still unable to deport him. Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the government has not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight, although, it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner. The petitioner claims that he is stateless and therefore have right to asylum.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
Ruling:
1. The petition is granted. A foreign national, not enemy, against whom no criminal detention. He also has the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to human beings, as proclaimed in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, of which the Philippine is a member. The theory on which the court is given power to act is that the warrant for his without any of law. The possibility that he might join or aid disloyal elements if turned out at large does not justify prolonged detention, the remedy in that case being to impose conditions in the order of release and exact bail in a reasonable amount sufficient sureties.
Agustin vs. Edu, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner
Facts:
The validity of a Letter of Instruction providing for an early warning device for motor vehicles as well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No.1 issued by the Land and Transportation Commission is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power. The Letter of Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner, who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary and oppressive. Considering the allegations contained, a temporary restraining order was issued and respondents were required to answer. Then an answer from the respondents in paragraphs X and XI(including its subparagraphs 1,2,3,4) of petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction as well as Land Transportation Commission Administrative order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral, unreasonable and illegal, the truth being that said allegation are without legal and factual basis.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition be dismissed.
2. Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 requiring the installation of early warning devices to vehicles repugnant to the due process clause?
3. Does Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, violates the provisions and delegation of police power?
4. Whether or not the “early-warning device” requirement on vehicles an expensive redundancy?
5. Does the letter of Instruction compel the car owners to purchase the prescribed early warning device?
Rulings:
1. The petition must be dismissed. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: “, the hazards posed by such obstruction to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization; , the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine government under P.D, no. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices;” It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: “ The Philippine adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the la of the land, ****.” The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in a way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war the principle of international morality
2. Letter of Instruction NO.229 requiring the installation of early warning devices to vehicles are not repugnant to the due process clause. Conjectural claims of petitioner as to number o nighttime vehicular collisions cannot be a basis for setting aside of law that was promulgated after a careful study by the Executive Department.
3. The Letter of Instruction was valid exercise of Police Power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent not susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power. Justice laurel, in the first leading decision, Calalang vs. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
4. Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1.) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles 2.) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles 3.) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and near bumpers of motor vehicles 4.) well-lighted two petroleum lamps.
5. There is nothing in Letter of Instruction which compels the car owners to purchase the prescribed early warning device. Vehicle owners can produce the device themselves with a little ingenuity.
The validity of a Letter of Instruction providing for an early warning device for motor vehicles as well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No.1 issued by the Land and Transportation Commission is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power. The Letter of Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner, who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary and oppressive. Considering the allegations contained, a temporary restraining order was issued and respondents were required to answer. Then an answer from the respondents in paragraphs X and XI(including its subparagraphs 1,2,3,4) of petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction as well as Land Transportation Commission Administrative order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral, unreasonable and illegal, the truth being that said allegation are without legal and factual basis.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition be dismissed.
2. Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 requiring the installation of early warning devices to vehicles repugnant to the due process clause?
3. Does Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, violates the provisions and delegation of police power?
4. Whether or not the “early-warning device” requirement on vehicles an expensive redundancy?
5. Does the letter of Instruction compel the car owners to purchase the prescribed early warning device?
Rulings:
1. The petition must be dismissed. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: “
2. Letter of Instruction NO.229 requiring the installation of early warning devices to vehicles are not repugnant to the due process clause. Conjectural claims of petitioner as to number o nighttime vehicular collisions cannot be a basis for setting aside of law that was promulgated after a careful study by the Executive Department.
3. The Letter of Instruction was valid exercise of Police Power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent not susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power. Justice laurel, in the first leading decision, Calalang vs. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
4. Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1.) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles 2.) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles 3.) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and near bumpers of motor vehicles 4.) well-lighted two petroleum lamps.
5. There is nothing in Letter of Instruction which compels the car owners to purchase the prescribed early warning device. Vehicle owners can produce the device themselves with a little ingenuity.
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